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A computational framework that can account for
object categorization and identification has gained
empirical support from recent studies of monkey
behavior and neurophysiology.
Primates are avid categorizers, devoting considerable
energy to grouping objects, labeling them and
interacting with them. These are critical skills for
survival, for example when distinguishing predator
from prey, friend from enemy or edible object from
inedible object. Categorization can also be a source of
enjoyment, as exemplified by collectors who create
novel categories such as ‘stamps with waterfalls on
them’ or ‘impaled garden gnomes.’ The occipito-
temporal visual pathway is necessary for such skills —
damage to this pathway can lead to a variety of
deficits in visual object categorization [1]. There is a
strong consensus that the occipito-temporal pathway
is responsible for categorizing objects on the basis of
visual information (but see [2]). Neuroscientists are
eager to explain how the neural networks in the occip-
ito-temporal pathway represent and process informa-
tion for this purpose. Two recent papers by Sigala and
colleagues [3,4] tackle this issue, drawing on methods
from traditionally different fields, such as formal mod-
eling of categorization and single-cell recording in
animals.
The distributed nature of object representations in
the occipito-temporal pathway has recently been
revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) [5]. Various object categories were found each
to elicit a stable and distributed pattern of activity
across the occipito-temporal pathway. Rejecting the
popular approach of focusing on small areas highly
selective for a particular category [6], Haxby et al. [5]
uncovered a unique signature for each category
across the entire occipito-temporal pathway, contain-
ing sufficient information to support recognition at a
general level, for example distinguishing cats from
chairs, houses and faces. Although this distributed
representation may be capable of supporting catego-
rization at a general level — chair, face, house and so
on — the work did not reveal how discrimination of
exemplars within the same category is performed.
How, for example, does the occipito-temporal
pathway code for the distinction between office and
dining chairs or male and female faces, and how does
it uniquely code for one’s own house?
On the face of it, grouping objects into the same
category and discriminating between objects within
the same category may seem different problems.
Including all chairs in one category requires ignoring
many differences between them, whereas identifying
unique chairs requires attending to those very differ-
ences. Indeed, some argue [7] that these problems are
so different that the left hemisphere is specialized for
making generalizations, as in categorization, whereas
the right hemisphere is specialized for making fine
distinctions, as in identification. There are, however,
computational approaches that can account for both
categorization and identification within the same
system. This is perhaps best illustrated in one exem-
plar-based model of categorization and identification,
the generalized context model [8].
According to this model, categorization and
identification are based on similarity to memories for
previously encountered exemplars. Evidence for a
particular categorization is based on the summed
similarity to category exemplars, whereas evidence for
a particular identification is based on the similarity to
a specific exemplar; a categorization or identification
decision is based on the relative evidence across
alternatives. Exemplars are represented as points in a
multidimensional psychological space, where dimen-
sions are qualities such as color, shape, spatial fre-
quency content and the like. Similarity between a
stimulus and an exemplar is an exponentially decreas-
ing function distance in that space.
One central aspect of the generalized context
model is that dimensions are attended according to
their diagnosticity for categorization (or identification).
This selective attention process acts to stretch (or
shrink) the multidimensional space so that some
dimensions become more (or less) important than
others in determining similarity between items
(Figure 1). This assumption of dimension-selective
attention is critical for the generalized context model
accounting for both categorization and identification
[8–10] — stimulus identification typically requires
attention to multiple dimensions, whereas many cate-
gorization problems may require attention to a limited
number of diagnostic dimensions.
The generalized context model has accounted for a
variety of fundamental findings in categorization,
identification, and other domains. The basic model
has been extended by incorporating connectionist
learning mechanisms [11], stochastic elements
necessary for time-course predictions [12,13], and
additional attentional elements for stimulus and
response selection [14]. Until recently, however, tests
of the generalized context model and related models
have been confined to human behavior.
Sigala et al. [3] have now shown that the general-
ized context model can  account for categorization by
both humans and monkeys. They found that the gen-
eralized context model accounts much better for 
the available data than a number of competing
models, including those based on prototype abstrac-
tion or conditional probabilities. Monkey and human
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observers learned to classify exemplars of faces or
fish varying along four dimensions, for example, in the
case of faces: eye separation, eye height, nose length
and mouth height. Only two of the dimensions, eye
separation and eye height, were diagnostic, in that
both had to be attended for perfect categorization; the
other two dimensions were irrelevant. During catego-
rization, monkeys and humans placed more weight on
diagnostic dimensions than non-diagnostic dimen-
sions in computing similarities. Furthermore, monkeys
and humans showed increased perceptual sensitivity
along diagnostic dimensions when making similarity
judgments after categorization experience. Essen-
tially, observers attended to dimensions that were
diagnostic for categorization — ignoring non-diag-
nostic dimensions — even outside of the context of
the categorization task.
Neurons in the occipito-temporal visual pathway,
particularly within the inferior temporal cortex in the
monkey, can develop selectivity for objects after cat-
egorization experience, appearing to represent those
objects in a low-dimensional psychological space 
[15]. What remains unclear, however, is whether all
dimensions of an object are equally represented by
inferior temporal cells, or whether task relevance
influences selectivity to particular dimensions. In the
work of Sigala et al. [3], all feature values along all
dimensions were presented with equal frequency: this
could presumably lead to equivalent representations
of diagnostic and non-diagnostic dimensions, as
frequency can be an important determinant of visual
responses [16].
In a companion paper, Sigala and Logothetis [4]
recorded from inferior temporal neurons of monkeys
while they categorized faces or fish learned in the
behavioral study [3]. The authors did not focus on cells
highly selective for one category, such as ‘face cells’ or
‘fish cells’. Indeed, some of the cells apparently dis-
criminated within both face and fish dimensions (see
also [15]). After recording the activity of all visually
responsive cells, Sigala and Logothetis [4] found that a
large proportion showed selectivity along at least one
stimulus dimension. For example, one cell might
respond more to wide eyes than close eyes and
another cell (quite possibly the same cell) might
respond more to a round fish tail than a curved fish tail. 
Strikingly, although neural responses were not
specifically responsive to faces versus fish, neurons
showing dimensional selectivity were limited to those
coding for dimensions that were diagnostic for
categorization (but see [15]). These findings [4] thus
demonstrate a tight relationship between categoriza-
tion behavior and the distributed information
represented in the responses of inferior temporal cells
in the occipito-temporal visual pathway. The com-
putations described by the generalized context model
framework could be supported by such as network.
What still remains rather unclear is how best to
characterize the difference in firing rate for diagnostic
versus non-diagnostic dimensions. The generalized
context model has typically characterized ‘attentional
weighting’ of diagnostic dimensions as a flexible
process, with dimension weights shifting in an optimal
fashion depending on task demands [10]. In addition
to such an adaptive process, dimensional weighting
could also reflect a form of perceptual learning in
which diagnostic dimensions become perceptually
more discriminable, perhaps because of enhanced
receptive field properties or an increased number of
neurons coding a dimension. Finally, this weighting
could also reflect perceptual learning of another kind:
the creation of entirely new dimensions within the
visual system [17]. In the case of the fish stimuli, pre-
sumably novel to the monkeys, it is not unreasonable
to imagine that new feature dimensions for the shape
of the dorsal fin, ventral fin and so forth may have
been ‘created’ during the categorization task. Unfor-
tunately, Sigala and Logothetis [4] did not report
recordings of inferior temporal cell activity before and
after categorization, so the true nature of this dimen-
sional attending remains unclear. 
It also seems important to measure neural activity 
in different kinds of task that do not emphasize 
the same diagnostic features. Is the dimensional
selectivity expressed in the activity of single neurons
‘hard-coded’ from perceptual learning, or is it ‘soft-
coded’ in the service of a particular categorization
task? In humans, expertise identifying objects from a
category, birds or cars for example, leads to changes
Figure 1. Selective attention to a dimension that is diagnostic
for categorization stretches the psychological space. 
In this simplified version of the task used by Logothetis and
colleagues [3,4], as subjects learn to categorize fish into 
two groups the multidimensional space becomes relatively
stretched along a diagnostic dimension (here shape of the 
tail) relative to the non-diagnostic dimensions. Before catego-
rization (A), object 1 is equally similar to objects 2 and 3. 
During categorization (B), object 1 becomes more similar to
object 2 than to object 3 through selective attention to the
shape of the tail.
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in selectivity in the fusiform face area — a face-selec-
tive part of the human occipito-temporal pathway —
even in the context of a location task where identity is
completely irrelevant [18]. This type of perceptual
learning, which generalizes both to new exemplars of
a category and to other tasks where diagnostic
dimensions are irrelevant, has been studied mainly for
acquired expertise at identifying objects at an individ-
ual level. Whether the categorization task used by
Sigala and Logothetis [4] can lead to similar general-
izations remains to be investigated.
These new studies of categorization in monkeys
[3,4] demonstrate once again the power of the exem-
plar-based framework for understanding visual object
recognition. This should not come as a surprise:
image-based, viewpoint-dependent theories of object
recognition [19] are essentially exemplar-based
accounts, and have received support from neuro-
physiology [20]. More than evoked potentials or fMRI,
single-cell recordings may provide the right level of
analysis for testing models such as the generalized
context model, and the neurophysiology appears par-
ticularly well positioned to bridge the large gap cur-
rently existing between human imaging studies and
computational models of object categorization.
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